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EEC Sanctions Against South Africa: The 
Common Commercial Policy and Delimitation of 
the EEC's Powers 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 16, 1986, the nations of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) reached an agreement involving a variety of sanctions to be imposed by 
the EEC against South Africa. The agreement included bans on new investments 
in South Africa, on imports of South African gold coins, or Krugerrands, and 
on iron and steel products. From a practical standpoint this package of sanctions 
was almost entirely symbolic. l If the package had included a ban on coal imports, 
as originally intended, it would have had a much more substantial effect. This 
is due to the fact that South Africa exports two-thirds of its coal to the EEC.2 
Initially the proposed sanctions agreement included a ban on coal imports.3 
The EEC however, removed the measure when West Germany, backed by 
Portugal, refused to support a ban on coal imports.4 
Regardless of the effectiveness of the sanctions agreement, it raises issues 
concerning a Member State's power in areas where the EEC has already acted. 
This Note will examine whether a Member State may impose unilateral sanctions 
on South Africa despite the fact that the EEC has already acted in that regard. 
Initially, the Note will analyze the Treaty of Rome.5 Next it will focus on an 
interpretation of Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome. Generally, Article 113 
contains the objective of a common commercial policy. The Note will also look 
at the exclusivity of the EEC's ability to act, and whether Member States are to 
have concurrent powers. 
II. TREATY OF ROME 
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the basic structure of the EEC. A 
central objective of the Treaty, as presented in Article 2, is the harmonious 
I No Fire from Kohl, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 1986, at 57. 
2Id. 
, /d. 
4Id. 
S Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done at Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. 
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development of economic activities.6 Article 113 of the Treaty calls for a com-
mon commercial policy based on uniform principles.' Article 113 reads in part: 
[T]he common commercial policy shall be based on uniform prin-
ciples, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion 
of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in 
measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect 
trade such as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies.s 
Two questions must be addressed in considering the ability of a Member State 
to act unilaterally with respect to commercial subjects on which the EEC has 
already acted. The first question is whether the EEC's sanctions fall within the 
ambit of the common commercial policy.9 If the first question is answered in 
the affirmative, then the second inquiry regards the degree of exclusivity of the 
EEC's powers relating to the act in question. lO The European Court of Justice 
(European Court) issued two opinions which establish guidelines for use in 
considering the two questions presented by Article 113. 
III. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 113 
On November 11, 1975, the European Court issued its first opinion, Opinion 
1175. 11 This decision was initiated by a request for an opinion of the European 
Court concerning the compatibility of a proposed draft "Understanding on a 
Local Cost Standard" with the Treaty of Rome. 12 This opinion revolved around 
the questions of whether the EEC had the power to conclude the "Understand-
ing on a Local Cost Standard" and, if so, whether its power to do so was 
exclusive. 13 
In Opinion 1/75, the European Court considered the substance of the common 
commercial policy, and determined that the term was to be applied in a broad, 
evolving sense. 14 The transaction at issue involved the setting of minimum 
cbnditions for export credits. The Court recognized that the transaction fell 
6 Treaty of Rome, supra note 5, at art. 2. See Dawkins, European Vision of Free Market on Track, The 
Boston Sunday Globe, Jan. 11, 1987, at AID, col. 5. 
, Treaty of Rome, supra note 5, at art. 113. 
8 [d. 
9 See generally Opinion of the Court (Understanding on a Local Costs Standard) 1175, 1975 E. Comm. 
Ct.]. Rep. 1355, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8365 (1976) [hereinafter Opinion 
1175]. 
10 [d. 
11 Opinion 1175, supra note 9. 
12 [d. at 1356-57. 
13 [d. at 1359-6\. 
14 A. PARRY & J. DINNAGE, PARRY & HARDY: EEC LAW 425, 426 (1981). See also Opinion 1175, supra 
note 9, at 1362-63. 
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within the context of export policy. IS Furthermore, the Court expanded that 
category to include measures concerning credits for the financing of local costs 
linked to export operations. '6 
The European Court stated that the EEC, when implementing measures 
covered by Article 113, is empowered, usually through the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to initiate internal rules of 
EEC law as well as to conclude agreements with countries outside of the EEC.17 
The Court explained that a commercial policy involves the combination and 
interaction of internal and external measures, with no individual measure hav-
ing priority over the others. IS 
In the second opinion, Opinion 1178, the European Court also addressed the 
interpretation of Article 113 and the scope of the common commercial policy.'9 
The Court established conclusively that it is no longer possible to interpret 
Article 113 restrictively. The Court defined restrictive as limiting the common 
commercial policy to the "use of instruments intended to have an effect only 
on the traditional aspects of external trade."20 The term "traditional aspects" 
presumably refers to those aspects of commercial policy specifically enumerated 
in Article 113.21 In addition, the Court endorsed the use of an expansive reading 
of Article 113 by claiming that the power of the EEC to implement a commercial 
"policy" based on "uniform principles" required the administration of external 
trade from a wide perspective.22 Accordingly, the Court held that the subjects 
listed in Article 113 under the heading of commercial policy was not exhaus-
tive. 23 The Court concluded by stating that "[a] restrictive interpretation of the 
concept of common commercial policy would risk causing disturbances in intra-
community trade by reason of the disparities which would then exist in certain 
sectors of economic relations with non-member countries."24 This broad inter-
pretation seems to be in accord with an early statement by one Commentator 
that "the commercial policy [means] all measures intended to regulate economic 
15 Export policy is mentioned explicitly in Article 113 as falling within the common commercial 
policy. See text accompanying note 8. 
16 Opinion 1175, supra note 9, at 1362. 
17 ld. at 1362-63. 
18 ld. at 1363. 
19 Opinion of the Court 1178 (International Agreement on Natural Rubber), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 2871, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8600 (1979) [hereinafter 
Opinion 1178]. The agreement in question involved an attempt to achieve a balanced growth between 
supply and demand for natural rubber in an effort to stabilize prices in the long run for both exporters 
and importers, as well as to ensure a reliable supply for importers. [d. 
20 [d. at 2913. 
21 See text accompanying note 8. 
22 Opinion 1178, supra note 19, at 2913. 
"ld. 
241d. 
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relations with the outside world."25 Another Commentator concluded that the 
scope of the common commercial policy includes at least all measures affecting 
the movement of goods.26 
In light of the European Court's Opinion 1178, the recent package of sanctions 
enacted by the EEC raises issues concerning whether a Member State, apart 
from the EEC, may simultaneously impose similar sanctions against South Af-
rica. The first question is whether the sanctions agreement falls within the scope 
of Article 113. As discussed previously, an application of Article 113 results in 
a need to discern the meaning of common commercial policy. The sanctions 
amount to restrictions on trade with a non-member country and therefore 
appear to fall within the scope of commercial policy. Thus, due to the broad 
definition of commercial policy used in Opinion 1175 and Opinion 1178, such a 
sanctions agreement appears to qualify as common commercial policy. Although 
such an agreement which is intended to regulate external trade, is not men-
tioned in the Article 113 list, according to Opinion 1178 it may still fall within 
the scope of the Article.27 
It is also possible, however, that the sanctions agreement could be viewed as 
a foreign policy measure enforced through commercial policy. Should the sanc-
tions agreement be held to be outside the common commercial policy, a possi-
bility of disturbances in intra-community trade due to a disparity in the degree 
of sanctions levied against South Africa would still exist. 28 Given this possibility 
and the wide scope of the commercial policy, precedent indicates that the 
sanctions agreement falls within the scope of common commercial policy even 
if considered a foreign policy measure. 
IV. EXCLUSIVITY 
The second issue addressed in Opinion 1175 was whether the EEC's power is 
exclusive with regard to the actions it formulates. 29 In Opinion 1175, the Court 
based its answer to this question on the premise that the common commercial 
policy of Article 113 should be viewed in the context of EEC operations and 
for the protection of the EEC's common interests. 3D With these views in mind, 
the various Member States must seek to adapt their own particular interests to 
25 1961 (II) HAGUE RECUEIL 90, cited in Ie Tallec, The common commercial policy of the EEC, 25 INT'L &: 
COMPo L.Q. 732, 738 (1976). 
26 Kapteyn, The Common Commercial Policy of the European Economic Community: Delimitation of the 
Community's Power and the European Court of justice's Opinion of November 11,1975, II TEX. INT'L L.J. 
485,494 (1976) [hereinafter Kapteyn]. 
27 Opinion 1178, supra note 19, at 2913. 
28 !d. 
29 Opinion 1175, supra note 9, at 1363. 
,old. at 1363-64. 
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those of the other Member States.31 Unilateral actions by Member States to 
ensure the separate satisfaction of their own interests in external relations, which 
act concurrently with the EEC actions, risk compromising the effective defense 
of the EEC's common interests.32 Therefore, in a field which is covered by the 
common commercial policy, it is impossible for the EEC and the Member States 
to exercise concurrent powers.33 Accordingly, the European Court in Opinion 11 
75 stated: 
To accept that the contrary were true would amount to recognizing 
that, in relations with third countries, Member States may adopt 
positions which differ from those which the Community [EEC] in-
tends to adopt, and would thereby distort the institutional frame-
work, call into question the mutual trust within the Community and 
prevent the latter from fulfilling its task in the defence of the 
common interest.34 
In Opinion 1178, the European Court went further and determined what the 
exclusivity arrangement would entail should the agreement in question not be 
covered solely by the common commercial policy.35 In the facts addressed in 
Opinion 1178, the agreement, an International Agreement on Natural Rubber,36 
also fell within the ambit of general economic policy.37 The Court stated that if 
the agreement comes at least in part under the common commercial policy, 
then it could not be withdrawn from the competence of the EEC in the name 
of general economic policy.38 The Court in Opinion 1178 did note, however, that 
if a Member State were to finance economic clauses in the agreement, separate 
participation by that Member State in the agreement in question would be 
justified.39 
In the situation examined in this Note, the question of a Member State's 
ability to impose sanctions unilaterally is likely to turn on the degree of exclu-
sivity of the EEC's action. Assuming, arguendo, that the sanctions package does 
fall within the scope of Article 113, it would appear on its face to be an exclusive 
measure. The European Court clearly stated, in Opinion 1175, that EEC acts 
relating to common commercial policy exclude unilateral actions by the Member 
States. In Opinion 1178, the Court stated that the fact that the measure in 
" Jd. at 1364. 
32Jd. 
33ld. 
"/d. 
3. opinian 1178, s"/lTa note 19, at 2914. 
36 Jd. at 2911. 
37/d. at 2914. 
>ald. 
""Id. at 2918. 
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question did not fall completely under the common commercial policy would 
not be enough to defeat the exclusivity of the EEC's ability to act. 
An argument in favor of allowing unilateral actions by Member States is that 
the risk to common commercial policy considered by the European Court in 
Opinion 1175 does not apply to this case. The Court, in Opinion 1175, was 
concerned that allowing unilateral actions would jeopardize the effective defense 
of the EEC's common interests. The Court stated that allowing the Member 
States to have concurrent powers in this sphere would distort the institutional 
framework and endanger the mutual trust within the EEC. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Member States have an interest in speaking with one voice to the rest of 
the world.40 In the sanctions agreement examined here the common interest of 
the EEC was ostensibly to send a signal to South Africa that the present apart-
heid system would not be tolerated any longer. In other words, the Member 
States have an interest in the EEC's unified foreign policy, rather than its 
commercial policy. The EEC's interest would not change if it chose some other 
non-commercial vehicle through which to express its displeasure with the South 
African apartheid system. The fact remains, however, that economic sanctions 
are the most effective means of dealing with South Africa at this point in time. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how a Member State that chooses to impose harsher 
sanctions unilaterally would endanger the common commercial interests of the 
EEC and compromise mutual trust among the Member States. Should this 
problem eventually come before the European Court, the question which would 
have to be answered is essentially as follows: should the Court look to the policy 
which the EEC is setting forth, in this case a foreign political policy, or should 
it look to the vehicle through which the EEC is imposing that policy? If the 
Court looks to the latter then it will undoubtedly rule against any Member State 
which attempts to impose unilaterally harsher sanctions against South Africa. 
If the Court agrees with the former notion, however, then Member States will 
probably be free to impose harsher sanctions on their own. 
Thomas M. Corsi 
40 See generally Kapteyn, supra note 26, at 486. 
